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I agree completely with Devitt, first, that people do immediately 
understand sentences presented to them, that this understanding 
goes together with perceiveing the sentence in question 
(pronounced or written), and that it demands an explanation. 
Devitt himself stresses the involvement of competence in the 
process, and I agree. But, if the competence is involved, , why is 
voice-of-competence view on the wrong track? And the view 
connects well with findings reported in psycholinguistic literature. 
Of course, there are several very broad areas that are sufficiently 
specific to allow for hypothesis of a specialized competence and 
about which people have intuitions. One is human general 
understanding of number(s) that is quite specialized, and can be 
lost, as a consequence of brain damage, without impairment in 
other areas. The next is our spatial competence, presumably 
producing our spatial-geometrical intuitions. Coming closer to the 
domain of philosophy, there are several normative areas, the 
paradigmatic one being the moral domain (and I guess the 
aesthetic one). The voice-of-competence view can and should be 
generalized to all of them. !
Keywords: Moderate Voice of Competence (MoVoC), simulation, 
competence !!
I am deeply honored by Michael readiness to contribute to the present 
volume. He and I have been discussing the issues about the nature of 
language faculty for a very long time, all this against the common 
background of a naturalistic approach in philosophy; I have learned a lot 
from him, and each round of the discussion is full of new and exciting 
surprises. This time, there are two topics in the oven: the disagreements 
about the nature and the role of competence, which is a huge topic, and 
the almost-disagreement about the role of language understanding in our 
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1. The Moderate Voice of Competence (MoVoC) proposal !
Michael called Chomsky inspired theories of the role of linguistic 
competence “Voice of Competence” theories. I liked his choice of the 
name a lot, and decided to call my own proposal The Moderate Voice of 
Competence (MoVoC) proposal. In the present paper Michael comes with 
several accusations against MoVoC. He lists six points. Let me start with 
the first three. The first has to do with insufficiency of detail needed to 
turn the voice of competence hunch into a real theory. Here is the 
application of his general criticism to my particular proposal, from the 
paper above:  
Well, concerning the first point, Nenad has, with his flow-chart, 
provided a bit more than a hand wave to explain how the allegedly 
embodied principles yield the intuitions. But it seems to me only a 
very little bit more and not nearly enough. We need an account of 
how Ann’s competence which, we are supposing, produces strings 
like (W) but not (W*), also “comes out with some kind of answer, 
some Yes or No signal” about the acceptability of these strings. How 
does competence move from (1) in the flow-chart to the “immediate 
spontaneous answer” of (2)? Why should we even suppose that there 
is such a move? I don’t see any explanation in Nenad’s discussion.  
Second, again to my knowledge, no argument has ever been given 
for VoC until Georges Rey’s recent attempt (2013) which, I argue 
(2013), fails (see references in Michael’s paper above). Concerning 
the second point, Nenad (2009, 2012) has produced an argument 
for VoC and against ordinarism, to his great credit. But, in my 
view, Jutronić (this volume) shows that this argument fails.  
Here is his third objection:  
So far as I can see, Nenad has not addressed my third point, a point 
also emphasized by Jutronić: whichever way VoC is understood, 
given what else we know about the mind, VoC seems most unlikely 
to be true. 
I have decided to follow Michael’s reference to Dunja Jutronić, and 
address the first three questions in my reply to her, which thus becomes 
reply to her and Michael together. (I hope also thus to avoid repetition, 
and be able to stick to the usual limitations of space). 
Let me now list the additional three questions, raised by Michael long time 
ago (Devitt, references: 2006a,b, 2010b, 2013), and reiterated here: 
(i) If competence really spoke to us, why would it not use the 
language of the embodied theory and why would it say so 
little?  
(ii) There would be a disanalogy between the intuitions provided 
by the language faculty and by perceptual modules.  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(iii)Developmental evidence suggests that the ability to speak a 
language and the ability to have intuitions about the language 
are quite distinct, the former being acquired in early childhood, 
the latter, in middle childhood as part of a general cognitive 
development. (Forthcoming)  
An argument for VoC should confront these implausibilities.  
Let me try to do it. Here is Devitt’s additional question one: “If 
competence really spoke to us, why would it not use the language of the 
embodied theory and why would it say so little?”  
Well, this is how processing devices in our heads and on out tables speak 
to us. My laptop communicates with me in Slovenian and English, not in 
its native code. Our spatial competence is sensitive to topological 
transformations, but does not use the professional vocabulary of topology 
when informing me about my perceived surrounding. I guess that this is 
generally the way our central nervous system works, and neurologists and 
evolutionary epistemologists will surely have a long story to tell about 
the reasons and the history behind this phenomenon. But it is not a 
specific problem that would tell against language competence in 
particular.  
Why would it say “so little”? There is an element of misunderstanding 
here: when talking about competence I talked only about one kind of 
task, namely deciding if the given string constitutes a sentence of my 
language. The example of language perception-understanding introduces 
a lot of new elements, and we shall come to this soon. For the moment, 
notice that even in my original kind of cases, deciding about the 
grammaticality of a given string, what competence says is not so 
impoverished. You ask me about one presumed sentence of my mother 
tongue, the competence says Yes, the next No, the following again Yes; if 
a competence can do it for thousands of sentences in the due course of 
time, it is not so little. Take Michael’s example:  !
(1) John seems to Bill to want to help himself. !
On the standard Chomskyan account competence produces a structural 
description (SD), a tree where “himself” is tied to John; this information 
enables the hearer to understand who is the “himself” who is the object of 
the helping intended. The hearer also understand that it is not Bill who 
wants to do it, rather that Bill is confronted with this seeming about John, 
and what John wants. Is this little? And the like for tens of thousands 
sentences. 
The additional question two: what about the “disanalogy between the 
intuitions provided by the language faculty and by perceptual modules”? 




In the case of language perception, for instance auditory one, it is 
plausible that language faculty either completes the work of perceptual 
system (if you take “perceptual” very narrowly), or forms a late stage of 
the perceptual work (if you take “perception” to involve linguistic 
understanding).  
The additional question three. The “ability to speak a language and the 
ability to have intuitions about the language are quite distinct”; the first 
appears in early childhood, the second later “as part of a general 
cognitive development.” Doesn’t his point to a separation of intuition-
capacity from linguistic competence? Not necessarily. Psycholinguist 
offer various theories; here is an exemplary proposal that ties the 
acquisition of full competence to a later stage:  
However, there are two qualifications that need to be made about 
the indirect and complex relationship between form and meaning 
in linguistic expressions. The first concerns language users who 
might be described as ‘not fully competent’, such as very young 
children, second language learners, or aphasics who have lost 
access to part of their language competence. Such language users 
may resort to simplified strategies or heuristics for sentence 
processing. An example of a sentence processing heuristic is the 
‘agent first’ strategy, which says: ‘assume that the first noun phrase 
(NP) you encounter in a sentence is the “agent” of the “action” of 
the verb’. John C. L. Ingram (2007) Neurolinguistics An 
Introduction to Spoken Language Processing and its Disorders, 
CUP, p. 18.  
Let me finally mention a somewhat puzzling formulation from Michael’s 
criticism of G. Rey in his “Linguistic intuitions are not “the voice of 
competence” (in Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the 
Laboratory? ed.Matthew Haug. London: Routledge.) He mentions 
properties like morphemic constituency, syntactic structure and logical 
form” and discusses the question of information related to these 
properties that might be contained in the output of the language module 
He doubts that the language module has a structural description output 
“that specifies those properties” and tentatively proposes rather than the 
output that has those properties. I keep being puzzled. The input sentence 
already has these properties, and central processor cannot decode them; 
why would it function better with an input from module having the same 
un-decodable properties? ! !
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2. Simulation, production, understanding !
Let me now pass to the second topic, the role of linguistic competence in 
speech understanding (and understanding of written material as well). 
Michael writes:  
Before getting to his criticism, Nenad gives an interestingly 
different account of how a speaker begins the process leading to 
her intuitive judgment: she “might try to say the target sentence to 
herself, she engages in a ‘tentative production’, sometimes 
described as ‘simulation’” (2006: 526). So, where I talk of the 
speaker questioning herself about both the production and the 
understanding of the expression, Nenad talks only of production. 
And Nenad introduces talk of “simulation”.  
I now think that both these aspects of Nenad’s account are 
mistaken, for reasons I will give in a moment.  
As I mentioned above, this is a bit of misunderstanding. I did not mean to 
limit the role of MoVoC to grammaticality decisions; I just limited myself 
to discussing this issue, since it provided central examples about which 
Chomskyans and their critics disagree. So I agree very much with what 
Michael says in the sequel:  
Before that, however, I must give two developments that I have 
already made to my ordinarism.  
What I am emphasizing here is that a person’s linguistic intuitions 
are perceptual judgments that can be as immediate as those of the 
art expert and Braden, without the conscious and deliberate 
exercise of her competence in what, following Nenad, I am here 
calling “simulations”.  
Yes, I agree completely. To return to John and Bill example, the 
competent hearer normally ‘hears” the sentence as claiming that what 
seems to John is that Bill wants to help himself, Bill. Immediate 
understanding of sentences in one’s mother tongue is very close to 
perception; let me describe it as following immediately after “hearing” in 
the very narrow sense of the term, call it hearing-n, and thus as 
completing the “full hearing”, call it hearing-f. So much we can agree 
upon, I hope. The question now concerns the role of competence in such 
hearing-f. Here is Michael:  
Just as the paleontologist’s, art expert’s, and Braden’s years of 
experience and education have made them quick at deploying their 
concepts of pig’s jawbone, fake, and fault, respectively, so too a 
speaker’s years of experience and education is likely to make her 
quick at wielding her concept of grammaticality, at least in simple 
cases. Thus Ann may well arrive at her intuitions about (W) and 
(W*) without needing the help of a “simulation”.  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The following example, popular in discussions of linguistic 
intuitions (see, for example, Fitzgerald 2010: 139), both 
exemplifies such immediate perceptual judgments and shows that 
they can be wrong:  
Many more people have been to France than I have.  
When a competent speeaker is presented with this she is likely to 
judge immediately that it is grammatical. Yet it isn’t, as will 
become apparent to her as soon as she tests it against words simply 
makes no sense.  
A word of caution is necessary here. To say that a speaker may 
perceive that a string has a certain syntactic property without a 
conscious and deliberate exercise of her competence, without a 
“simulation”, is not to say that her competence is not involved in 
her perception. 
End of quotation of Michael. As I said, I agree completely with Michael, 
first, that people do immediately understand sentences presented to them, 
that this understanding goes together with perceiveing the sentence in 
question (pronounced or written), and that it demands an explanation. 
(Earlier in my work, I concentrated upon the case most popular in the 
Chomskian tradition, the one of checking whether a sentence belongs to 
the speaker’s language. It is here that I stressed the role of simulation, 
since in this context linguists normally mention speaker’s “saying the 
sentence” to herself.) Had I been talking about subject’s understanding of 
someone else’s sentence, I might not have appealed to simulation. I also 
agree with the last passage of the quoted text:  
A word of caution is necessary here. To say that a speaker may 
perceive that a string has a certain syntactic property without a 
conscious and deliberate exercise of her competence, without a 
“simulation”, is not to say that her competence is not involved in 
her perception.  
But I wonder: how does this fit with Devitt’s argument against VoC? He 
asks;” If competence really spoke to us, why would it not use the 
language of the embodied theory and why would it say so little?” But, if 
the competence is involved, as the just quoted passage suggests, why is 
VoC on the wrong track?  
So, let me briefly defend the hypothesis that the “perception” option is 
not only compatible with the MoVoC, but connects well with findings 
reported in psycholinguistic literature. Here is Michael again:  
(1) In an understanding test, a speaker is consciously aware of the 
difference understanding a string and not understanding it. In a 
production test, a speaker is consciously aware of repeating the 
string and then, it seems, seeing if she understands it. By 
“experience” I simply have in mind these mental processes of 
which the person is thus consciously aware.  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The person having these experiences goes on to judge whether they 
are of something grammatical. Such perceptual judgments are 
likely to be quite reliable for she will have acquired her ability to 
deploy her concept of grammaticality by reflecting on such 
experiences.  
Devitt points to his development of this idea in his (2013), and says  
In understanding (1) /i.e. the Bill-John sentence-NM/, we hear it as 
having those linguistic features and not others in that, as a result of 
all the processing in the language system, we come up with a 
representation that has those features and not others; for example, 
it has a feature that takes ‘himself’ to co-refer with ‘John’ not ‘Bill. 
What I do find very implausible is that, in hearing (1) in this way, 
the central processor thereby has the informational basis for the 
intuitive judgment that ‘himself’ co-refers with ‘John’. We have 
been given no reason to believe that. Hearing an utterance in a 
certain way is one thing, judging that it has certain properties, 
another.  
Let me note that the naïve speaker will of course not use the term “co-
refer” (I hope we agree on this). So, her understanding (and the intuitive 
judgment) probably says that “himself” here has to do with John, John is 
the object of the wanting to help. Now, two questions for Michael:  
First, the representation that has this relevant feature (himself=John) must 
depend on a relatively complex tree-like structure somewhere in the 
mind; it is probably not present in the central processor (too specialized 
for it); so where else can it be but in the competence-parser?  
Second, I agree that CP does not have “the informational basis for the 
intuitive judgment that ‘himself’ co-refers with ‘John’.” So, what does 
have it? The speaker comes up with the intuition (formulated in a non-
professional way), and the intuition is correct. Where does it come 
from, if the CP does not have the informational basis? Where from, if 
not from competence-parser?  
(2) We might metaphorically describe reflecting on experiences in 
the understanding test as “watching the competence attempt to 
understand a string” but we should not describe reflecting on 
experiences in the production test as “watching the competence 
producing the string”. For, as just noted, the competence does not 
produces the string, the CP does. So, the first stage of Nenad’s 
flow-chart for the production test is wrong: there is no “tentative 
production (by competence)”. 
Yes and No. The first stage as I described it is typical for the kind of case 
for which I introduced it, namely for the context in which the subject is 
asked (or asks herself) Is this sentence OK? (Is it a sentence of my 
language, and the like). It does not look the same in the context of routine 
understanding, and here Devitt is right about the obvious fact that there is a 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difference. We again disagree about the main question: how does subject’s 
cognitive apparatus proceed in the understanding. Here is Michael’s 
proposal:  
(3) Perception of the string, with or without an understanding or 
production test, provides information to a speaker’s CP about the 
properties of the string in just the same way that perception of a 
white stone, marble statue, and serve provide information to a 
paleontologist, art expert, and Vic Braden about the properties of 
their respective entities. Perception, perhaps accompanied by some 
introspection, is a way of learning about the world.  
I agree that there is an analogy: The three heroes, paleontologist, art 
expert, and Vic Braden are experts in their respective areas. I, a naïve 
Croatian speaker, might be as good in recognizing and understanding the 
sentences of my language as an art expert is good at recognizing fakes. 
But there is difference in detail. How do you know this piece of art is a 
fake? Well, here are my reasons, the expert hopefully answers, and lists 
some sophisticated indications for this judgment. His judgment is based 
on expertize, acquired by academic study, with a lot of explicit material, 
all worked out by his CP, stored in his memory and accessible to his 
consciousness. My naïve linguistic judgment is very different: I cannot 
draw for you the parsing tree for (1) (nor for its Croatian equivalent). “I 
am not at home among trees.”  (to paraphrase J.R.R. Tolkien’s, The 
Fellowship of the Ring). I have no memories of having learned the 
parsing trees for relevant language(s). The informational basis for my 
judgment is not there, in the field of my CP. It has to be somewhere else. 
Why not in the parser? This is what MoVoC suggests. Here is a 
possibility, and a schematic flowchart:  !
!
I hope to develop it further, with big thanks to Michael, of course (see 
also the reply to Dunja). !

































3. MoVoC Generalized !
Let me finally place my linguistic MoVoC proposal in a wider context 
(see also reply to Dunja, the last section). There are several very broad 
areas that are sufficiently specific to allow for hypothesis of a specialized 
competence and about which people have intuitions.  
One is human general understanding of number(s) that is quite 
specialized, and can be lost, as a consequence of brain damage, without 
impairment in other areas. People do have elementary numerical 
intuitions, and they show intricate patterns of development. This does 
suggest numerical competence, as a specialized capacity, and as a source 
of elementary numerical (arithmetical) intuitions.  
The next is our spatial competence, presumably producing our spatial-
geometrical intuitions. Both arithmetical and spatial intuitions are crucial 
for early stages of our understanding of our surrounding, and continue to 
play some role in the more advanced frameworks of science, in particular 
in TEs, like the famous Einstein’s ones.  
Coming closer to the domain of philosophy, there are several normative 
areas, the paradigmatic one being the moral domain (and I guess the 
aesthetic one). We do form moral judgments, which often have 
recognizably intuitional character, with self-evidence and immediacy as 
the main features. Again, the pathology can often parallel the one in 
linguistic area: collapse of moral capacities as a result of specific 
damages to the brain, and so on. (Moral judgments also play a central 
role in our understanding of politics, and in political philosophy). 
Aesthetic judgments of taste come quite close.  
I am less sure about epistemology and metaphysics, but I would stress 
that our central epistemological judgments are in fact normative, and in 
many respects parallel to the moral ones. This points to the availability of 
epistemic competence, presumably related to the acceptability of 
evidence and of testimony.  
The most speculative hypothesis about specialized competence would 
concern out metaphysical intuitions: modal, mind-body related, and 
categories (general kinds) related ones. Modality seems the best 
candidate: people do make all sorts of modal judgments, and the jump 
from factual-actual to possible, impossible, necessary and so on is a most 
common phenomenon in everyday conversation, as well as in science. 
Again, judgments seem to be specialized, and the most basic among them 
do have typical features connected with intuition. So, we may, and 
perhaps even should, apply the MoVoC proposal to them: their basic 




What about other metaphysical areas? I would go with Austin, replacing 
his “words” with “’knowledge’” and assume that our basic metaphysical 
‘knowledge’ “embodies all the distinctions men have found worth 
drawing, and the connections they have found worth making, in the 
lifetimes of many generations: these surely are likely to be more 
numerous, more sound, since they have stood up to the long test of the 
survival of the fittest, and more subtle, at least in all ordinary and 
reasonably practical matters, than any that you or I are likely to think up 
on the spot. (“A Plea For Excuses”, in Philosophical Papers, 1961, p. 
182).  
In short, the MoVoC proposal seems to be generalizable to many crucial 
areas, and in particular to all central areas of philosophy. 
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